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attorney for negligence narrow and predictable. More recently, however,
the class of those to whom an attorney owes a duty has expanded and is less
identifiable. Consequently, the answer to the question "who has standing
to assert a malpractice claim against an attorney?" is no longer simple or
convenient. In this environment of change, this article explores the ques-
tion of whether an insurance company has standing to assert a malpractice
claim against an attorney it has retained to represent an insured.
Part I discusses what was once the foundational requirement for an at-
torney malpractice claim, the existence of an attorney-client relationship.
Privity of contract was once the sine qua non of the attorney-client rela-
tionship. However, the privity requirement has been relaxed in contempo-
rary malpractice jurisprudence, thus opening the door for attorney liability
to nonclients in general and the insurance company that hired the attorney
in particular. This section examines the methods used to relax or avoid
the privity of contract requirement, while they simultaneously attempt to
preserve the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship.
Part II addresses the primary thesis. It examines, through two decades of
decisional law, whether an insurance company has standing to assert a mal-
practice action against defense counsel hired to represent an insured. The
case law reflects that two competing forces are shaping the common law
landscape of attorney malpractice law in the context of insurance defense
practice. The first is preserving the sanctity of the attorney-client relation-
ship. The second is the social policy of imposing liability on a culpable
attorney. In the insurance defense context, some states recognize both the
insurer and insured as common clients of the attorney. This tripartite re-
lationship often creates confusion for all parties. By examining cases from
jurisdictions that have addressed this issue, this article explores the differ-
ent methods courts have adopted to address these sometimes competing
policies.
I. ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
At one time, the majority of jurisdictions viewed attorney malpractice
claims as exclusively contract-based actions.' The general rule was well
stated in a North Carolina case:
Although the liability of an attorney on the grounds of negligence is ordinar-
ily enforced by an action on the case for negligence in the discharge of his
professional duties, the liability in reality rests on the attorney's employment
1. The decision to use the phrase "'attorney malpractice' rather than 'legal malpractice' or
some other designation ... is prompted by our concern that use of the term 'legal malpractice'
might well lead to confusion by its connection in some minds with 'legal' or 'lawful' conduct."
Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Holt, 224 S.E.2d 177, 180 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978).
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by the client and is contractual in its nature. Hence, before the attorney can
be made liable, it must appear the loss for which he is sought to be held arose
from his failure or neglect to discharge some duty which was fairly within the
purview of his employment. Moreover, an attorney is liable for negligence in
the conduct of his professional duties to his client alone, that is, to the one be-
tween whom and the attorney the contract of employment and service existed,
and not to third parties
Subsequent case law in many states has expanded the causes of action
available to a potential plaintiff. Today, most jurisdictions recognize that
an attorney malpractice claim can sound in tort, contract, or both.' In fact,
the majority of jurisdictions now consider attorney malpractice claims to
be essentially tort actions. 4
Because there is an implicit promise in an attorney-client contract that
the attorney will perform his or her services in a competent and profes-
sional manner,5 a breach of this promise gives rise to a valid contract claim,
even though negligent performance may also give rise to a tort action.
Attorneys are subject to liability for failure to exercise reasonable care, ir-
respective of their contractual duties.6 In this context, it is policy, not the
contract, that gives rise to the legal obligation.
To prevail on an attorney malpractice tort claim in most jurisdictions,
the plaintiff must prove (1) existence of an attorney-client relationship,
(2) negligence on the part of the attorney, and (3) proximate cause of injury.'
Most of the time, the existence of an attorney-client relationship between
the plaintiff and the attorney is an essential element of the claim because
the duty to exercise reasonable care counensurate with the profession em-
anates out of that relationship! Thus, an attorney, "with limited exceptions,
2. Id. (quoting 7 CJ.S., Attorney Client § 140, at 978).
3. See cases cited infra note 7.
4. See Barcelo v. Elliot, 923 S.W.2d 575, 577 (fex. 1996); Gravel v. Schmidt, 527 N.W.2d
199, 202 (Neb. 1995); Newton v. Meade, 143 S.W3d 571, 574 (Tex. App. 2004); Keonjian
v. Olcott, 169 P.3d 927, 931 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); Rice v. Lister, 980 P.2d 561, 565 (Idaho
1999);Johnson v. Carleton, 765 A.2d 571, 575 (Me. 2001); Montgomery v. Jack, 556 So. 2d
267, 270 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
5. Thompson v. Erving Hatcheries, Inc., 186 So. 2d 756, 757 (Miss. 1966).
6. See, e.g., Pancake House, Inc. v. Redmond, 716 P.2d 575, 580 (Kan. 1986).
7. See Pierce v. Cook, 992 So. 2d 612, 617 (Miss. 2008); Stoklosa v. McGill, 1992 Ohio
App. LEXIS 728, at *7 (Ct. App. Feb. 21, 1992); Storm v. Golden, 538 A.2d 61,64 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1988); Progressive Sales, Inc. v. Williams, Willeford, Boger, Grady & Davis, 356 S.E.2d
372, 375 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987); LaMetta v. Todisco, 2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2542, at *36
(Super. Ct. Sept. 8, 2003) (unreported); Wolski v. Wandel, 746 N.W2d 143,149 (Neb. 2008);
Collins v. Miller & Miller Ltd., 943 P.2d 747, 752 (Ariz. 1996); Fox v. White, 215 S.W.3d
257,260 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007); Marrs v. Kelly, 95 S.W3d 856, 860 (Ky. 2003); Semenza v. Nev.
Med. Liab. Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 184, 185-86 (Nev. 1988).
8. Fox, 215 S.W3d at 260. See also Pickney v. Tigani, 2004 Del. Super. LEXIS 386, at *11
(Super. Ct. Nov. 30, 2004); Legacy Homes v. Cole, 421 S.E.2d 127, 129 (Ga. Ct. App.
1992).
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owes no actionable duty to strangers or nonparties to the attorney-client
relationship in the way responsibilities are performed."9
Typically, the attorney-client relationship is grounded in some form of
contract, either expressed or implied. 0 However, because the focus is on
the relationship itself, rather than how it is manifested, it may arise from
implications such as where one attorney gives gratuitous advice ' or makes
a single special appearance at the request of the attorney of record. 2 Be-
cause formalities are not required, neither the receipt nor expectation of
compensation is dispositive of whether an attorney-client relationship ex-
ists.' 3 Sometimes the relationship can arise without any dealings between
the client and attorney. 4 In most cases, however, the relationship must
exist before one has standing to bring a lawsuit. 5
The nature of the work performed and the circumstances under which
confidences were divulged are relevant considerations in determining
whether the requisite relationship exists. 16 Equally important is whether
the client reasonably believes an attorney-client relationship exists. Thus,
an attorney-client relationship may exist even if the attorney is not re-
tained, if the client has a reasonable belief that he is seeking legal advice
from a lawyer in the lawyer's professional capacity. 17 Whether the attorney
through his conduct created or consented to the client's expectation is an
9. Fox, 215 S.W3d at 260. But see Safeway Managing Gen. Agency, Inc. v. Gamble &
Clark, 985 S.W2d 166, 169 (Tex. App. 1998) (although there is no attorney-client relation-
ship between an insurance company and defense counsel retained to represent an insured, the
attorney is not protected from actual fraud or intentional misrepresentation).
10. See Daniels v. DeSimone, 13 Cal. App. 4th 600, 618 (1993); Franko v. Mitchell, 762
P.2d 1345, 1351 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (citing R. MALLEN & V. LEVrTT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE
§ 101, at 173-74 (1981)); Robinson v. Benton, 842 So. 2d 631, 637 (Ala. 2002); Paradigm
Ins. Co. v. Langerman Law Offices, 24 P.3d 593, 595 (Ariz. 2001); Pickney, 2004 Del. Super.
LEXIS 386, at *38-39; Gulf Ins. Co. v. Berger, 79 Cal. App. 4th 114, 126 (2000).
11. See Franko, 762 P.2d at 1351; Robinson, 842 So. 2d at 636; Holland v. Lawless, 623 P.2d
1004, 1008 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981); Moen v. Thomas, 628 N.W2d 325, 329 (N.D. 2001).
12. See Streit v. Covington & Crowe, 82 Cal. App. 4th 441,445-46 (2000).
13. Id. at 444; see also Fox v. White, 215 S.W3d 257, 261 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007); Mansur v.
Podhurst, Orseck, PA., 994 So. 2d 435, 438 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); In re McGlothlen,
663 P.2d 1330, 1334 (Wis. 1983); Warner v. Stewart, 930 P2d 1030, 1036 (Idaho 1997); Bd.
of Overseers v. Mangan, 763 A.2d 1189,1192 (Me. 2001); Att'y Grievance Comm. v. Parker,
506 A.2d 1183, 1185 (Md. 1986); Holland, 623 P.2d at 1008; Broyhill v. Aycock & Spence, 402
S.E.2d 167, 172 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991); Berger, 79 Cal. App. 4th at 126.
14. See Streit, 82 Cal. App. 4th at 445;Atty Grievance Comm., 506 A.2d at 1185.
15. See Chan v. Lee, 2004 Haw. LEXIS 291, at *2-3 (Apr. 23, 2004); McCarty v. Brown-
ing, 797 So. 2d 30, 31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Kurtenbach v. TeKippe, 260 N.W2d 53,
56 (Iowa 1977).
16. See Franko v. Mitchell, 762 P2d 1345, 1351 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988); Cook v. Cook, 912
P2d 264, 266 (Nev. 1996); Landis v. Hunt, 610 N.E.2d 554, 558 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
17. See, e.g., Marx v. Benzel, 66 P.3d 735, 736 (Alaska 2003); Franko, 762 P.2d at 1351; Fox,
215 S.W.3d at 261; Mansur, 994 So. 2d at 438; Mays v. Adkins, 585 S.E.2d 735, 736 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2003) (professional advice or assistance must be both sought and received in a legal mat-
ter); In re Anonymous, 655 N.E.2d 67 (Ind. 1995); Bd. of Overseers, 763 A.2d at 1192-93.
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important consideration." Thus, where the client's subjective belief is rea-
sonable the attorney-client relationship should be recognized. 9
The existence of an attorney-client relationship can be analyzed from
either a contractual or tort perspective.20 Under a contractual analysis, an
implied contract arises between the attorney and client when (1) a person
seeks advice or assistance from an attorney, (2) the advice or assistance
sought pertains to a matter within the attorney's professional competence,
and (3) the attorney expressly or impliedly agrees to give or actually gives
the desired advice or assistance.2' In appropriate cases, the third require-
ment can be established with proof of detrimental reliance, such as where
the client reasonably relies on the attorney to provide competent advice
or assistance, and the attorney, aware of such reliance, does nothing to
negate it.22 An objective standard that focuses on the conduct of the par-
ties rather than their subjective beliefs determines whether a contractual
relationship should be implied.23
18. See, e.g., Paradigm Ins. Co. v. Langerman Law Offices, 24 P.3d 593, 595-96 (Ariz.
2001); Lovell v. Winchester, 941 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1997); Troop v. Lumer, 806 N.Y.S.2d 599,
600 (N.Y App. Div. 2005) (client's subjective belief alone is not sufficient to establish the
attorney-client relationship.).
19. See, e.g., Mansur v. Podhurst, Orseck, P.A., 994 So. 2d 435, 438 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1008); see also Marx, 66 P.3d at 736; Franko, 762 P.2d at 1351; Fox v. White, 215 S.W3d
257, 261 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007); Mays, 585 S.E.2d at 737; Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Rouse, 961
P.2d 204, 207 (Okla. 1998); In re Conduct of Wyllie, 19 P.3d 338, 344 (Or. 2001); Breuer-
Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 728-29 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); In re McGlothlen, 663
P.2d 1330, 1334 (Wis. 1983); Douglas v. Monroe, 743 N.E.2d 1181, 1184-85 (Ind. Ct. App.
2001); Spicer v. Gamble, 789 So. 2d 741, 744-45 (La. Ct. App. 2001); Paradigm Ins. Co. v.
Langerman Law Offices, 24 P3d 593, 595-96 (Ariz. 2001).
Section 14 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers provides: "A relation-
ship of lawyer and client arises when: (1) a person manifests to a lawyer the person's intent that
the lawyer provide legal services for the person; and ... (a) the lawyer manifests to the person
consent to do so." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 (2000). The
comments further provide that either intent or acquiescence may establish the relationship. Id.
cmt. c. Pertinent to this article, the Restatement comments that an insurer should be recognized
as having standing to assert a professional negligence claim against an attorney. Id. cmt. f.
20. See TJD Dissolution Corp. v. Savoie Supply Co., Inc., 460 N.W.2d 59, 62 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1990); Saylor v. Nichols, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 1090, at *4-5 (Ct. App. Mar. 28, 1988);
Robertson v. Gaston, Snow, Ely & Bartlett, 536 N.E.2d 344, 348-49 (Mass. 1989); U.S. Bank,
N.A. v. Nat'l Lenders, Inc., 2008 Mass. Super. LEXIS 124, at *4 (Super. Ct. Apr. 9, 2008).
21. See Kury v. Calecham, 2007 Mass. Super. LEXIS 420, at *5 (Super. Ct. Feb. 14, 2007);
State v. Gordon, 692 A.2d 505, 506 (N.H. 1997); Fanaras Enters. v. Doane, 666 N.E.2d
1003, 1006 (Mass. 1996); Stivrins v. Flowers, 729 N.W2d 311, 317 (Neb. 2007); Atkinson v.
Haug, 622 A.2d 983, 986 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); DeVaux v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 444 N.E.2d
355, 357 (Mass. 1983); Comm. on Prof'l Ethics v. Mollman, 488 N..2d 168, 171 (Iowa
1992); Bd. of Overseers v. Mangan, 763 A.2d 1189, 1192-93 (Me. 2001); Keegan v. First
-Bank, 519 N.W.2d 607, 611-12 (S.D. 1994).
22. See Kurtenbach v. TeKippe, 260 N.W.2d 53, 56 (Iowa 1977); Kury, 2007 Mass. Super
LEXIS 420, at *5-6; DeVaux, 444 N.E.2d at 357; McVaney v. Baird, Holm, McEachen, Ped-
erson, Hamann & Strasheim, 466 N.W2d 499, 506 (Neb. 1991); In re Kinney, 670 N.E.2d
1294, 1298 n.4 (Ind. 1996).
23. See Avery Pharms., Inc. v. Haynes & Boone, L.L.P., 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 769, at
*16-17 (App. Feb. 5, 2009).
38 Tort Trial & Insurance Practice Law Journal, Fall 2010 (46:1)
Pursuant to a tort analysis, an attorney-client relationship can be proven
to exist without any expressed agreement. Rather, the relationship is cre-
ated whenever a person seeks and receives legal advice from an attorney
under circumstances that would lead a reasonable person to rely on the
attorney's advice.24 The tort theory offers protection to the person injured
when the lawyer should reasonably foresee that the person might be in-
jured if the advice is given negligently.2" The difference in the two theories
is perspective. Contract focuses on the reasonable expectations of clients
while tort focuses on what the attorneys should reasonably foresee as the
consequence of their actions.
A. Tripartite Relationship Among Insurance Companies,
Insureds, and Defense Counsel
Aspects of both the contract and tort analyses are present in the insurance
context. When an insured is sued by a third party, the insurance contract
creates a tripartite relationship among the insurance company, insured,
and defense counsel by virtue of the language of the insurance contract.
The standard insurance policy requires the insurance company to defend
the insured. In fulfillment of this obligation, the insurer retains an attorney
to represent the insured. By virtue of the obligation to defend, control of
the litigation belongs to the insurance company. Because of the insurance
contract, an attorney should foresee that negligent 'performance can harm
directly the insured and the insurance company. The policy language and
ensuing obligations distinguish the relationship among insured, insurer,
and lawyer from the situation when a friend or family member guarantees
or gratuitously pays the attorney fees. In the latter situation, the payment
of fees alone is typically not enough to create an attorney-client relation-
ship between the friend or family member and the attorney.2 6
The relationship among an insurance company, insured, and retained
defense counsel is unique. In no other area of the law are parties routinely
represented by an attorney chosen and paid by a third party whose interests
may differ from those of the individual the attorney was hired to represent.
Nevertheless, because of the insurance policy language, a majority of ju-
risdictions recognize the doctrine of dual representation by a common at-
torney for the benefit of two or more persons.27 This position is consistent
24. See TJD Dissolution Corp., 460 N.W2d at 62; Saylor, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 1090, at
*5-6.
25. See cases cited supra note 24.
26. See, e.g., DeAngelis v. Rose, 727 A-2d 61, 69 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
27. See Lifestar Response of Ala., Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 17 So. 3d 200, 217 (Ala. 2009);
Home Indem. Co. v. Lane Powell Moss & Miller, 43 E3d 1322, 1330 (9th Cir. 1995) (inter-
preting Alaska law); Nat'l Union Ins. Co. v. Dowd & Dowd, 2 E Supp. 2d 1013, 1017-18
(N.D. Ill. 1998) (interpreting Illinois law); Spratley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 78
P.3d 603, 607 (Utah 2003); Gulf Ins. Co. v. Berger, 79 Cal. App. 4th 114, 133-34 (2000);
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with a lawyer's rules of professional responsibility, which recognize that
under appropriate circumstances a lawyer may represent two clients.2"
In the insurance context, the dual representation doctrine provides that
where the interests of the insurer and insured coincide, both may be con-
sidered clients of the defense counsel retained to represent the insured. The
doctrine provides for a conditional or qualified extension of the attorney-
client relationship to include both parties except where a conflict between
the interest of the insurer and that of the insured exists.2 9 If a conflict of
interest exists, the insured is the sole client of defense counsel.3"
Pine Island Farmers Coop v. Erstad & Reimer, P.A., 649 N.W2d 444, 451 (Minn. 2002);
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Bourlon, 617 S.E.2d 40, 45 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005), affid, 625
S.E.2d 779 (N.C. 2006); Finley v. Home Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Haw. 1998); Nev. Yel-
low Cab Corp. v. 8th Judicial Dist. Ct., 152 P.3d 737, 739 (Nev. 2007); Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co. v. Foster, 528 So. 2d 255, 272 (Miss. 1988); Gray v. Commercial Union Ins. Co.,
468 A.2d 721, 727 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983); O'Brien v. Tuttle, 21 Pa. D. & C. 3d 319,
322 (1981); Preferred Am. Ins. Co. v. Dulceak, 706 N.E.2d 529, 533 (111. Ct. App. 1999); Cin-
cinnati Ins. Co. v. Wills, 717 N.E.2d 151, 161 (Ind. 1999); McCourt Co. v. FPC Props., Inc.,
434 N.E.2d 1234, 1235-36 (Mass. 1982); In re Illuzzi, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 121, at *7 (Sept. 4,
1992); Barry v. USAA, 989 P.2d 1172, 1176 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
28. Disciplinary Rule DR 5-105(C) of the American Bar Association's Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility provides in pertinent part:
[A] lawyer may represent multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately represent
the interest of each and if each consents to the representation after full disclosure of the
possible effect of such representation on the exercise of his independent professional judg-
ment on behalf of each.
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(C) (1983).
Similarly, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct at Rule 1.7(a) prohibits, subject to
exception, a lawyer from representing multiple clients where the representation of one client
creates a concurrent conflict of interest. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (2002).
The Rule continues:
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under paragraph (a),
a lawyer may represent a client if:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent
and diligent representation to each affected client;
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against
another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding
before a tribunal; and
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
Id. ar R. 1.7(b). Under Rule 1.7 there can be situations where despite full disclosure and con-
sent, dual or multiple representation is ethically proscribed. As indicated in paragraph (b),
some conflicts cannot be consented to, meaning the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for
such agreement or provide representation on the basis of the client's consent. Id. See also Car-
negie Co. v. Summit Prop., 918 N.E.2d 1052, 1065 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009).
29. See cases cited supra note 27. At least one jurisdiction requires, in addition to an ab-
sence of a conflict of interest, that defense counsel or other attorney consult with the insured
and explain the implications of dual representation, and the insured must give expressed con-
sent to the dual representation in order for the doctrine of dual representation to arise. See
Pine Island Farmers Coop. v. Erstad & Reimer, P.A., 649 N.W2d 444, 452 (Minn. 2002).
30. See cases cited supra note 27. While the dual representation doctrine appears to be
the majority view, a substantial number of jurisdictions reject the doctrine and adhere to the
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Because of the caveat to the dual representation doctrine, an insurance
company's selection and compensation of defense counsel to represent an
insured does not per se create an attorney-client relationship between the
attorney and the insurer. The dual representation doctrine merely presup-
poses, in the absence of a conflict of interest, the existence of an attorney-
client relationship among the parties to the tripartite relationship. Should
the caveat, i.e., a conflict of interest, exist, an insurance company generally
cannot maintain a malpractice action against an attorney. The attorney's
first obligation is always to the insured client."
The insurance contract language that supports recognition and ap-
plication of the dual representation doctrine also evidences a direct com-
mercial transaction among the insured, insurer, and defense counsel. This
relationship is typically expressed by saying that these parties are in privity
of contract. For centuries, privity represented an unassailable fortress that
protected attorneys from malpractice claims. Because of their shared heri-
tage, both doctrines-privity and dual representation-are inextricably
linked to the evolution and development of the law of attorney malprac-
tice. The latter represents a twentieth century adaptation of the former to
fit the sui generis relationship that exists in the insurance context.
B. Privity of Contract
Privity is a contract-based principle and is often indicative of whether an
attorney-client relationship exists. The denial of standing to assert a mal-
practice claim to individuals not in privity of contract is based on three
rationales. First, an attorney's liability to third parties could deprive the
contracting party of the right to control the attorney's performance of their
agreement.32 Second, extending the duty to cover nonparties would expose
attorneys to infinite liability to an indeterminate class.33 Last, but not least,
expanding a duty to third parties could interfere with a lawyer's duty of
undivided loyalty to the client.3 4
view that the insured is the defense counsel's sole client. See Atlanta Int'l Ins. Co. v. Bell, 475
N.W2d 294,297 (Mich. 1991); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Weiss, 194P.3d 1063,1066 (Colo.
Ct. App. 2008);,Federal Ins. Co. v. N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co., 847 N.Y.S.2d 7, 12 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2007); First Am. Carriers, Inc. v. Krogers, 787 S.W2d 669,671 (Ark. 1990); In re Young-
blood, 895 S.W2d 322, 328 (Tenn. 1995); In re Rules of Prof'l Conduct & Insurer Imposing
Billing Rules & Procedures, 2 P.3d 806, 814 (Mont. 2000); Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Pullman, Com-
ley, Bradley & Reeves, 929 E2d 103,108 (2d Cir. 1991); Gen. Sec. Ins. Co. v.Jordan, Coyne &
Savits, LLP, 357 E Supp. 2d 951, 957 (E.D. Va. 2005).
31. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 30.
32. See Needham v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d 1060,1062 (D.C. Ct. App. 1983); Estate of Leon-
ard v. Swift, 656 N.W2d 132, 144-45 (Iowa 2003); Barefield v. DPIC Cos., 600 S.E.2d 256,
270 (W. Va. 2004).
33. See Needham, 459 A.2d at 1062; Estate of Leonard, 656 N.W2d at 144-45.
34. See, e.g., Sisson v. Jankowski, 809 A.2d 1265, 1268 (N.H. 2002); DeAngelis v. Rose, 727
A.2d 61, 65 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999); Shoemaker v. Gindlesberger, 887 N.E.2d 1167,
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The common law rule provided that, absent fraud or collusion, an at-
torney is not liable to third parties not in privity for damages arising
out of professional malpractice." In the absence of privity, suits by non-
clients would interfere with the attorney's duty to represent the client
diligently and without reservation.36 The essential purpose of the privity
rule is to insure the inviolability of the attorney's duties of care, loyalty,
and contract to the client. 7 For example, in Texas, a state that adheres
to the strict privity requirement, there is no attorney-client relationship
between an insurance company and defense counsel retained to defend
an insured.3"
Although still followed in some states, most jurisdictions have relaxed the
rule of strict contractual privity.3 9 Under limited circumstances, attorneys
have been exposed to liability to third parties with whom they are not in
privity of contract. Courts have developed a variety of approaches to justify
extending an attorney's liability exposure to nonclients. These approaches
include (1) situations closely approximating privity, (2) foreseeability of the
risk theory, (3) third-party beneficiary theory, (4) the balancing of factors
approach, and (5) the principles of the Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers § 51.
1171 (Ohio 2008); Barcello v. Elliot, 923 S.W.2d 575, 578-79 (Tex. 1996); Homeowner's
Assistance Corp. v. Merrimack Mort. Co., 2000 Me. Super. LEXIS 13, at *7-8 (Super. Ct.
Jan. 24, 2000); Neal v. Baker, 551 N.E.2d 704, 706 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990); Ferguson v. Cramer,
709 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Md. 1998); Spinner v. Nutt, 631 N.E.2d 542, 544 (Mass. 1994); Estate
of Leonard, 656 N.W2d at 144-45.
35. Nat'l Savings Bankv. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 203 (1880).
36. See cases.cited supra note 34.
37. See cases cited supra note 34.
38. Safeway Managing Gen. Agency, Inc. v. Clark & Gamble, 985 S.W2d 166, 169 (Tex.
App. 1998).
39. The strict privity requirement is still followed in Alabama, Nebraska, Texas, and Maine.
See Robinson v. Benton, 842 So. 2d 631, 634 (Ala. 2002); Swanson v. Ptak, 682 N.W2d 225,
231 (Neb. 2004); Barcello, 923 S.W2d at 578-79. Cf. Belt v. Oppenheimer, Blend, Harrison
& Tate, Inc., 192 S.W3d 780, 788 (Tex. 2006) (nonclient executor can sue attorney for mal-
practice for negligently injuring estate itself); Neven v. Union Trust Co., 726 A.2d 694, 701
(Me. 1999) ("When there is a personal representative to assert the financial claims on behalf
of the estate, however, the better rule appears to be not to allow individual beneficiaries to
assert claims for negligence.").
Arkansas cannot be considered a strict privity jurisdiction because its lawyer immunity
statute, ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-310 (2009), contains two exceptions to the general privity
requirement. See McDonald v. Pettus, 988 S.W2d 9 (Ark. 1999). Likewise, New York, which
continues to express the strict privity requirement in its decisional law, is not a strict privity
jurisdiction because it treats the closely approximating privity exception as a rule of legal
malpractice, rather than as a rule of law that creates a distinct duty sounding in misrepresen-
tation. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 605 N.E.2d
318,320 (N.Y 1992). One could make a strong argument that Texas should be removed from
the list because it recognizes the right of excess insurers to sue attorneys on an equitable
subrogation theory. See Am. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Canal Ins. Co., 843 S.W2d 480, 484-85
(Tex. 1992).
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1. Situations Closely Approximating Privity
Some states have extended attorney liability to nonclients in situations
closely approximating privity between the parties.4° The requirement of a
relationship so close as to approach that of privity prevents attorneys from
being exposed to unlimited liability.41 Accordingly, the closely approximat-
ing privity exception applies only when (1) defendant is aware that his
statements will be used for a particular purpose, (2) plaintiff is a known
party who relies on the statement in furtherance of that purpose, and
(3) defendant engaged in conduct linking him to the plaintiff.42 Although
some jurisdictions view the closely approximating privity rule as an excep-
tion to the privity of contract requirement for attorney malpractice, others
view it as the basis for recognizing the existence of a distinct duty sounding
in negligent misrepresentation. 43 According to the latter view, negligent
misrepresentation is not the equivalent of attorney malpractice because li-
ability is not based on a breach of the duty a professional owes a client, but
rather on an independent duty arising out of the attorney's awareness that
someone other than the client will rely and act on the advice.44
2. Foreseeability of Risk Theory
A duty to a third-party can also arise as a result of a judicial determination
that the social importance of protecting an aggrieved party's interest out-
weighs the attorney's interest in immunity from extended liability.4 This
theory is generally used when the injury is not purely economic such as
when personal injury is caused by the attorney's negligence. The contract
rationale (i.e., privity) underlying attorney malpractice claims is entirely
displaced by the tort rationale (i.e., negligence). Relying on traditional tort
principles, courts put aside the notion that the legal obligation emanates
out of a contract. Rather, the legal obligation is firmly rooted in the law.4
40. See Prudential Ins. Co., 605 N.E.2d at 320 (attorney could be liable if relationship be-
tween attorney and third party was "so close as to approach that of privity").
41. Id.
42. Id. See also Ad. Paradise v. Perskie, Nehmad & Zelner, 666 A.2d 211, 214 (NJ. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1995); RE. Applings Interests v. McCamish, Martin, Brown & Loeffler, 953
S.W2d 405, 409 (Tex. App. 1997).
43. See FE. Applings Interests, 953 S.W2d at 408.
44. Id.; Homeowner's Assistance Corp. v. Merrimack Mort. Co., 2000 Me. Super. LEXIS
13, at *7-8 (Super. Ct. Jan. 24, 2000); Mehaffy, Rider, Windholz & Wilson v. Cent. Bank,
N.A., 892 P.2d 230, 236 (Colo. 1995); Kirkland Constr. Co. v. James, 658 N.E.2d 699, 701
(Mass. Ct. App. 1995).
45. See, e.g., Sisson v. Jankowski, 809 A.2d 1265, 1267 (N.H. 2002); see also Republic Nat'l
Title Ins. Co. v. Garrell, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3670, at *13 (Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 2004)
(unpublished).
46. See, e.g., Dudrow v. Ernst & Young, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2564, at *22 (Super.
Ct. Sept. 15, 1999); Sisson, 809 A.2d at 1267. See also Albright v. Burns, 503 A.2d 386, 389-90
(NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (after adopting the balancing of factors exception, the court
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The social interests involved, the severity of the risks, the likelihood of the
occurrence, the relationship between the parties, and the burden on the
defendants are relevant considerations.47 Courts that employ this model do
so sparingly.48 As explained by the Maryland Court of Appeals,
[i]n determining whether a tort duty should be recognized in a particular con-
text, two major considerations are: the nature of the harm likely to result
from a failure to exercise due care, and the relationship that exists between
the parties. Where a failure to exercise due care creates a risk of economic loss
only, courts have generally required an intimate nexus between the parties as
a condition to the imposition of tort liability. This intimate nexus is satisfied
by contractual privity or its equivalent. By contrast, where the risk created is
one of personal injury, no such direct relationship need be shown, and the
principle determinant of duty becomes foreseeability.
49
As the magnitude of risk increases, the requirement of privity is relaxed-thus
justifying the imposition of a duty in favor of a large class of persons where
the risk is of death or personal injury. Conversely, as the magnitude of the risk
decreases, a closer relationship between the parties must be shown to support
a tort duty.50
The foreseeable risk theory encompasses the tort theory of limited du-
ties that arise out of special relationships. Thus, the tort duty to exercise
care can arise out of the fiduciary duty an attorney owes to both the insured
and the insurer as a consequence of insurance policy obligations."'
3. Third-Party Beneficiary Exception
The third-party beneficiary exception is the most widely recognized excep-
tion to the privity of contract requirement. Unlike the foreseeability of the
risk theory, it generally applies to economic loss. An intended beneficiary
harmed by a lawyer's negligence in drafting a testamentary document may
bring a malpractice claim even though the beneficiary is not the lawyer's
client.5 2 To proceed on a third-party beneficiary theory, the plaintiff must
also noted that an attorney may be held liable to a nonclient where he had reason to foresee
the specific harm that occurred).
47. See, e.g., Sisson, 809 A.2d at 1267.
48. See, e.g., Simpson v. Calivas, 650 A.2d 318, 321-22 (N.H. 1994).
49. Jacques v. First Nat'l Bank, 515 A.2d 756, 759-60 (Md. 1986).
50. Id. at 761.
51. See, e.g., Atlanta Int'l Ins. Co. v. Bell, 475 N.W.2d 294, 297 (Mich. 1991) (recognizing
that defense counsel occupies a fiduciary relationship to the insured, as well as to the insur-
ance company).
52. See, e.g., Schreiner v, Scoville, 410 N.W2d 679, 682 (Iowa 1987); Copenhaver v. Rog-
ers, 384 S.E.2d 593, 596 (Va. 1989); Noble v. Bruce, 709 A.2d 1264, 1272-73 (Md. 1998);
Pinckney v. Bruce, 2004 Del. Super. LEXIS 386, at *18-19 (Super. Ct. Nov. 30, 2004);
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demonstrate that the parties to the contract intended to confer a direct
benefit on him. 3 The intent to benefit must actually exist and be reflected
in the language of the document.5 4 This requirement reflects the view that
the third-party beneficiary theory is restricted to attorney malpractice
claims based on breach of contract.
A few jurisdictions also recognize the third-party beneficiary theory as
an exception to the strict privity rule in tort actions." In the tort context,
because the attorney can foresee injury to the third party as a consequence
of his dealings with the client, the intent to benefit the third party can
be proven with extrinsic evidence. Consequently, an intended beneficiary
may assert a malpractice action in either contract or tort.5 6 Despite its ap-
plicability to either tort or contract actions, the intended beneficiary the-
ory is a very limited and narrow exception to the privity requirement. Its
application is universally restricted to situations where the nonclient was
the actual intended beneficiary of the attorney-client relationship. Conse-
quently, social policy has led to the recognition of additional exceptions,
MacMillan v. Scheffy, 787 A.2d 867, 869 (N.H. 2001); Franko v. Mitchell, 762 P.2d 1345,
1352 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
53. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 52; Blair v. Ing, 21 P.3d 452, 461 (Haw. 2001).
54. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 52; Blair, 21 P.3d at 461.
55. See Simpson v. Calivas, 650 A.2d 318, 323 (N.H. 1994); Stowe v. Smith, 441 A.2d
81, 84 (Conn. 1981); Lorraine v. Grover, Ciment, Weinstein, 467 So. 2d 315, 317-18 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Flaherty v. Weinberg, 492 A.2d 618, 625 (Md. 1985); Hale v. Groce,
744 P.2d 1289, 1291 (Or. 1987); Mieras v. DeBona, 550 N.W2d 202,207 (Mich. 1996); Guy
v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744, 746-47 (Pa. 1983); Blair, 21 P.3d at 460; cf. Pizell v. Zuspann,
795 P.2d 42, 48, modified by 803 P.2d 205 (Kan. 1990) ("An attorney cannot be held liable
for the consequences of the attorney's professional negligence to an adversary of his or her
client.").
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts endorses the third party beneficiary rule. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981). Section 302 provides:
(1) Unless otherwise agreed between the promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of a prom-
ise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary
is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and either
(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of the promisee to pay
money to the beneficiary; or
(b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intended to give the beneficiary the
benefit of the promised performance.
(2) An incidental beneficiary is a beneficiary who is not an intended beneficiary.
The Restatement provides a two-part test for determining whether a person is an intended
third-party beneficiary. First, the trial court can bestow standing by determining whether
"the recognition of the beneficiary's right [is] 'appropriate to effectuate the intention of the
parties."' Next, the performance must "'satisfy an obligation of the promisee to pay money
to the beneficiary' or 'the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the benefi-
ciary the benefit of the promised performance."' Guy v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744, 751 (Pa.
1983); see also Raritan River Steel Co. v. Bekart & Holland, 407 S.E.2d 178, 181-182 (N.C.
1991).
56. See Simpson, 650 A.2d at 321; Stowe, 441 A.2d at 84; Lorraine, 467 So. 2d at 317-18;
Flaherty, 492 A.2d at 625.
The Expansion of Defense Counsel Liability to Include Malpractice Claims 45
such as the balancing of factors theory, that can be applied to a greater
variety of factual circumstances.
4. Balancing of Factors Approach
The balancing of factors approach is a policy-based exception to the priv-
ity of contract requirement. It requires courts to consider public policy
before determining whether an attorney owes a duty to a nonclient. Courts
that use this approach generally apply the following factors: "the extent to
which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability
of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury,
the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the
injury, and the policy of preventing future harm."" In addition, one should
consider whether recognizing liability would impose an undue burden on
the legal profession."8
The policy considerations against finding a duty to a nonclient are at
their greatest when doing so would affect the attorney's ethical obligation
to the client. The balancing of factors test has been criticized as being overly
broad "and so unworkable that it has led to 'ad hoc determinations and
inconsistent results."',9 Nevertheless, "[t]he balancing test has been cited
with approval by most jurisdictions which have considered the issue. 60
Several jurisdictions have adopted the balancing test with slight modi-
fication.6" Pursuant to this model, the first factor, i.e., the extent to which
the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, is modified to reflect
that the factor weighs in favor of imposing a duty on the attorney to non-
clients where the client specifically intended to benefit the nonclient. 62 An
attorney owes no duty to a nonclient in the absence of an intent to directly
benefit the nonclient.63 The modification of the first factor is designed to
address the primary policy concerns voiced against expanding an attorney's
liability exposure to include third parties.
57. Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 687 (Cal. 1961).
58. Id. at 688.
59. Noble v. Bruce, 709 A.2d 1264, 1271 (Md. 1998).
60. Donahue v. Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, P.C., 900 S.W2d 624,627 (Mo. 1995) (citing
RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTnCE § 7.11, at 383 (3d ed. 1993)).
See also Fickett v. Superior Court of Pima County, 558 P.2d 988, 990 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976).
61. See, e.g., Donahue, 900 S.W2d at 629; Trask v. Butler, 872 P.2d 1080, 1084 (Wash.
1994); Pizel v. Zuspann, 795 P.2d 42, 50, modifiedby 803 P.2d 205 (Kan. 1990). See also Watkins
Trust v. Lacosta, 92 P.3d 620, 625-26 (Mont. 2004) (Montana Supreme Court has cited to the
modified balancing factors approach twice but has not expressly adopted this theory); Leyba
v. Whitney, 907 P.2d 172, 179 (N.M. 1995); Jensen v. Crandall, 1997 Me. Super. LEXIS 72,
at *10-11 (Super. Ct. Mar. 4,1997); Connely v. McColloch, 83 P.3d 457,464-65 (Wyo. 2004);
Francis v. Piper, 597 N.W2d 922, 923 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999); Baer v. Broder, 436 N.Y.S.2d
693, 695 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 1981); Blair v. Ing, 21 P.3d 452, 459-60 (Haw. 2001).
62. See cases cited supra note 61.
63. See, e.g., Leyba, 907 P.2d at 175; Connely, 83 P.3d at 565.
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Those policy concerns-that liability will extend to an unlimited class
of individuals and interfere with the attorney-client relationship-are re-
solved by the requirement that the transaction must be intended to benefit
a nonclient directly. This requirement restricts the attorney's liability ex-
posure to a small identifiable class. It does not interfere with the attorney-
client relationship because the client's primary objective is to bestow a
direct benefit on the nonclient.
6 4
5. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 51
The multitude of common law declarations regarding the exceptions to the
privity requirement have been incorporated into the Restatement (Third) of
the Law Governing Lawyers, which recognizes that an attorney may owe
a duty of care to certain noncients under certain limited circumstances.
65
Thus, as described above, a lawyer owes a duty to a nonclient in situations
closely approximating privity, when injury to the nonclient is foreseeable, and/
or when the nonclient is an intended beneficiary of the lawyer's services.
66
64. See cases cited supra note 61.
65. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 (2000).
66. Id. Section 51 provides:
For purposes of liability under § 48, a lawyer owes a duty to use care within the meaning of
§ 52 in each of the following circumstances:
(2) to a nonclient when and to the extent that:
(a) the lawyer or (with the lawyer's acquiescence) the lawyer's client invites the non-
client to rely on the lawyer's opinion or provision of other legal services, and the
nonclient so relies; and
(b) the nonclient is not, under applicable tort law, too remote from the lawyer to be
entitled to protection;
(3) to a nonclient when and to the extent that:
(a) the lawyer knows that a client intends as one of the primary objectives of the repre-
sentation that the lawyer's services benefit the nonclient;
(b) such a duty would not significantly impair the lawyer's performance of the obliga-
tions to the client; and
(c) the absence of such a duty would make enforcement of those obligations to the
client unlikely; and
(4) to a nonclient when and to the extent that:
(a) the lawyer's client is a trustee, guardian, executor, or fiduciary acting primarily to
perform similar functions for the nonclient;
(b) the lawyer knows that appropriate action by the lawyer is necessary with respect to
a matter within the scope of the representation to prevent or rectify the breach of a
fiduciary duty owed by the client to the nonclient, where
(t) the breach is a crime or fraud or
(2) the lawyer has assisted or is assisting the breach;
(c) the nonclient is not reasonably able to protect its rights; and
(d) such a duty would not significantly impair the performance of the lawyer's obliga-
tions to the client.
The Expansion of Defense Counsel Liability to Include Malpractice Claims 47
Although the pronouncements of the Restatement are not binding, many
courts have found its reasoning persuasive. 6
7
1I. EXPANDING ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE LIABILITY FOR
ACTIONS BY INSURANCE COMPANIES
The recognition of exceptions to the strict privity requirement was a sig-
nificant first step towards expanding attorney liability for malpractice.
These exceptions, however, are not particularly suited to the insurance
environment because insurance contracts are not ordinary commercial
agreements. 68 Because of the economic and social policies inherent in the
insurance business and the unique nature of the insurance contract and re-
lationships created therein, courts have proceeded with great caution when
considering the issue of whether insurance companies should be granted
standing to assert a malpractice claim. Nevertheless, in a few states judi-
cial appreciation of these aspects of the insurance business and contract
has resulted in the expansion of attorney malpractice law to include ac-
tions by insurance companies. Reported decisions reaching this conclu-
sion have been issued in Michigan, California, Arizona, Minnesota, and
Ohio. Interestingly, each jurisdiction, relying on its own perception of the
unique nature of an insurance policy, has adopted a different approach to
the problem.
A. Michigan
In Atlanta International Insurance Co. v. Bell,69 the Michigan Supreme Court
became the first state supreme court to consider the question whether a
liability insurer possessed standing to sue for malpractice defense coun-
sel appointed to represent an insured. Here, Atlanta International Insur-
ance Co. appointed John Bell and David Herder to defend its insured,
Securities Services, in a wrongful death action.7" Bell answered the com-
plaint but failed to raise comparative fault as a defense.7 A judgment was
subsequently entered against Securities Services, which Atlanta as primary
67. See, e.g., Paradigm Ins. Co. v. Langerman Law Offices, 24 P.3d 593, 601 (Ariz. 2001);
Graves v. Webber, 2007 Me. Super. LEXIS 16, at *4 (Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 2007); Pivnick v. Beck,
762 A.2d 653, 654 (NJ. 2000); Chem-Age Indus., Inc. v. Glover, 652 N.W2d 756, 770-71
(S.D. 2002); Estate of Leonard v. Swift, 656 N.W2d 132, 145-46 (Iowa 2003); Pederson v.
Barnes, 139 P.2d 552, 561 (Alaska 2006). See State & County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 490 F. Supp.
2d 741, 743-44 (N.D.W Va. 2007).
68. See Johnny Parker, The Development of First-Party Extracontractual Insurance Litigation
in Oklahoma: An Analytical Examination, 31 TULSA L. REv. 57, 61-62 (1995) (outlines the dif-
ferences between insurance contracts and ordinary commercial agreements).
69. 475 N.W2d 294 (Mich. 1991).
70. Id. at 296.
71. Id.
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insurer was required to satisfy.7 2 Atlanta then filed suit against Bell and
Herder alleging malpractice for having failed to raise comparative fault as
a defense.73
In a motion for summary judgment, Bell acknowledged that his failure
to plead comparative fault constituted a breach of the professional standard
of care.14 He argued, however, that because no attorney-client relationship
existed between the parties, his sole duty was to his client, the insured.7"
The trial court agreed with Bell and dismissed the case.7 6 After Atlanta
appealed, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that "[no] at-
torney-client relationship exists between an insurance company and the
attorney representing the insurance company's insured.... Rather, an at-
torney's sole loyalty and duty is owed to the client alone, the client being
the insured, not the insurance company."77
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, holding that although some-
thing less than an attorney-client relationship existed between the insur-
ance company and the defendant, social policy justified expanding the
defendant's liability to include actions by an insurance company where
no conflict of interest existed.78 The court began its analysis by recogniz-
ing that liability policies typically include language that "'both obligate
the insurer to provide the insured with a defense and entitle the insurer
to control the defense."' 79 "The insurer typically hires, pays and consults
with defense counsel."80 "It has been appropriately recognized that '[de-
fense counsel] occupies a fiduciary relationship to the insured, as well as
to the insurance company . .. '" The court also recognized, however,
that the tripartite relationship among insured, insurer, and defense counsel
often creates the possibility of a conflict of interest. If a conflict arises, ap-
pointed counsel's primary duty of loyalty must be to the client and not to
the insurer.82
Because defense counsel owed a fiduciary duty to the insured and the in-
surer, and the insurer was ultimately responsible for satisfying a judgment
arising out of defense counsel's malpractice, special circumstances justi-
fied removing the case from the general prohibition against third-party
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 296 n.2.
75. Id. at 296.
76. Id.
77. Id. (quoting Ad. Int'l Ins. Co. v. Bell, 448 N.W2d 804, 805 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989)).
78. Id. at 297.
79. Id. (quoting ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDIss, INSURANCE LAW 822 (1988)).
80. Id. at 298.
81. Id. at 297 (quoting KEETON & WIIss, supra note 79, at 835-36).
82. Id.
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liability." Consequently, because no conflict of interest existed between
the insured and the insurer, "the attorney-client relationship, the interests
of the client, the interest of the insurer, and ultimately the public, which
otherwise would absorb the costs of the malpractice, all benefit from [the
attorney's] exposure to suit [by the insurance company]."8 4
The special circumstances that justified the application of basic norms
of the duty of care or negligence do not "'substantially impair an attorney's
ability to make decisions that require a choice between the best interests of
the insurer and the best interests of the insured"'85 where there is no con-
flict of interest. In the absence of a conflict "[t]he best interests of both in-
surer and insured converge in expectations of competent representation. '8 6
As expressed by the court, "[a]llowing the insurer to stand in the shoes of
the insured under the doctrine of equitable subrogation best serves the
public policy underlying the attorney-client relationship."87 Equitable
subrogation88 represents "a less sweeping, less rigid solution than creation
of an attorney-client relationship between the insurer and defense counsel,
but a more flexible, more equitable solution than absolution from liability
for professional malpractice."89 Thus, the doctrine of equitable subroga-
tion was used by the court to bridge the gap between extremes.90
B. California
In Fireman 's Fund Insurance Co. v. McDonald, Hecht & Solberg,91 a California
appellate court rejected the Bell analysis. It concluded that the doctrine of
equitable subrogation could not be used as a basis for allowing an insurer
to assert a malpractice claim against defense counsel it retained to repre-
sent an insured.92 According to the court in Fireman's Fund, a legal mal-
practice claim is personal to the client.93 Therefore, despite the fact that
subrogation and assignment are technically distinct, they are similar in that
each operates to transfer a cause of action against a third party to someone
else.94 Consequently, the policy concerns that prohibit the assignment of
83. Id.
84. Id. at 299.
85. Id. at 298 (quoting Cavanaugh, J., dissenting, at 303-04).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 297.
88. Id. at 298 ("Subrogation, simply defined, involves 'the substitution of one person in the
place ofanother with reference to a lawful claim or right"' (quoting 73 AM.JuR. 21, Subrogation
§ 1, at 598 (2010))).
89. Id. at 299.
90. The court in Bell noted that application of the doctrine of equitable subrogation must
be determined on a case-by-case analysis characteristic of equity jurisdiction. Id. at 295 n. 1.
91. 30 Cal. App. 4th 1373 (1994).
92. Id. at 1384.
93. Id. at 1381-82.
94. Id. at 1382.
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an attorney malpractice claim also apply to transfers of causes of action by
subrogation. 9
Despite the Fireman ' Fund court's rejection of equitable subrogation as
a basis for allowing a liability insurer to assert a malpractice claim, less
than nine months later another appellate panel entertained the issue of
whether defense counsel appointed to represent an insured by a liability
carrier owed an independent duty to the insurer.9 6 In Unigard Insurance Co.
v. O'Flaherty & Belgum, the insurer filed a complaint alleging malpractice
against the O'Flaherty law firm for its representation of an insured being
sued by an injured employee.97 The specific allegation was that the law firm
was negligent in failing to assert the worker's compensation act and related
defenses as the employee's exclusive remedy.98 Defendant's failure to assert
these affirmative defenses forced Unigard to hire new counsel to represent
the insured and pay the policy limits.99
The O'Flaherty law firm moved for nonsuit 00 The trial judge granted
the motion and dismissed the case.'0 ' Unigard appealed, contending that it
had an attorney-client relationship with the defendant and thus had stand-
ing to assert the malpractice action.1
0 2
Although the Unigard court rejected the Michigan Supreme Court's
adoption of equitable subrogation in Bell, it extensively accepted the Bell
court's reasoning. 13 Accordingly, the Unigard court concluded that
where the insurer hires counsel to defend its insured and does not raise or
reserve any coverage dispute, and where there is otherwise no actual or appar-
ent conflict of interest between insurer and the insured that would preclude
an attorney from representing both, the attorney has a dual attorney-client
relationship with both insurer and insured (emphasis omitted)." 4
The foregoing reasoning mandates that the insurer, seeking to bring a
malpractice claim against defense counsel, prove that an attorney-client
relationship existed and that there was no conflict of interest between it
and the insured. 05 The requisite relationship can be proven to exist by
virtue of the general rules used to ascertain this issue in typical cases.
95. Id.
96. Unigard Ins. Co. v. O'Flaherty & Belgum, 38 Cal. App. 4th 1229 (1995).
97. Id.





103. Id. at 1235-36.
104. Id. at 1236-37.
105. See, e.g., Gulf Ins. Co. v. Berger, 79 Cal. App. 4th 114, 133-34 (2000).
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There is no talismanic rule that allows a facile determination of whether a
disqualifying conflict of interest exists. Instead, "[tihe potential for conflict
requires a careful analysis of the parties' respective interests to determine
whether they can be reconciled ... or whether an actual conflict of interest
precludes insurer-appointed defense counsel from presenting a quality de-
fense for the insured."' 6
The California approach differs significantly from that employed in
Michigan. First, it assumes, in the absence of a conflict of interest between
insured and insurer, that a per se attorney-client relationship exists be-
tween the insurer and defense counsel. Michigan views the relationship
between the insurer and defense counsel as something less than an attor-
ney-client relationship. Second, in California, the absence of a conflict of
interest justifies recognition of a direct duty owed by defense counsel to
the insurance company. In Michigan, the duty emanates out of the special
relationship that exists between defense counsel and insurance company.
Finally, California law relies exclusively on traditional principles of neg-
ligence to afford a remedy, but Michigan law, which is also grounded in
negligence principles, employs a different standard, i.e., equitable subroga-
tion, to justify liability.
C. Arizona
Arizona first addressed the ability of an insurer to assert a malpractice ac-
tion against defense counsel retained to represent an insured in Paradigm
Insurance Co. v. Langerman Law Offices, PA.107 Paradigm had issued an in-
surance policy covering Dr. Benjamin Vanderwerf for medical malprac-
tice. 108 When Vanderwerf, director of the Samaritan Transplant Service,
was sued by a patient for medical malpractice, Paradigm assigned the case
to Langerman.' °9 Langerman advised Paradigm that it believed there was
no viable theory of liability against Samaritan but failed to investigate
whether Vanderwerf was covered by Samaritan's liability policy. °10 Thus,
Langerman failed to advise Paradigm whether the defense could be ten-
dered to Samaritan.] 1
For reasons not relevant to the case, Paradigm terminated Langerman's
representation and retained new counsel to represent Vanderwerf in the
medical malpractice case." 2 New counsel discovered that Samaritan had
106. Id. at 131 (quoting Dynamic Concepts, Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 61 Cal. App. 4th 999,
1007-08 (1998)).
107. 24 P.3d 593 (Ariz. 2001).
108. Id. at 594.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 594-95.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 595.
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liability insurance that constituted primary coverage that covered Vander-
werf in the medical malpractice case. New counsel tendered the medical
malpractice claim to Samaritan's insurer, which rejected it on the basis that
the tender was untimely"13
The case against Vanderwerf was subsequently settled for an amount
within Paradigm's policy limits."14 Langerman then presented Paradigm
with a bill for its legal services."' Paradigm refused to pay, claiming
Langerman had been negligent in failing to advise it that Samaritan's liabil-
ity coverage was primary and by not timely tendering the defense. 116 When
Langerman sued for fees, Paradigm counterclaimed for damages." 7
On motions for summary judgment, the trial court dismissed Paradigm's
claim against Langerman, concluding that no attorney-client relationship
existed between Langerman and Paradigm in the absence of an expressed
agreement that the defense attorney would represent both the insurer and
the insured." 8 Paradigm appealed and the Arizona Court of Appeals re-
versed in part," 9 holding that there could be an implied attorney-client
relationship between Langerman and Paradigm even without an expressed
agreement. 20 The appellate court held that in the absence of a real or ap-
parent conflict of interest between the insured and the insurer, defense
counsel represents both.' 2' Thus, according to the court, a dual attorney-
client relationship existed between Langerman and Paradigm, and this re-
lationship entitled the latter to bring a malpractice claim against retained
defense counsel.
122
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Arizona, Langerman argued that
"before an attorney-client relationship can form between an insurer and
the counsel it retains to represent an insured, express mutual consent must
be reached among all the respective parties."'23 The court rejected this
argument on the basis that an expressed agreement is not a prerequisite
for the existence of an attorney-client relationship.2 4 Rather, the requisite














125. Id. at 595-96.
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However, the court also recognized that concerns over conflicts of in-
terest among attorney, insured, and insurer are well founded.'26 Conse-
quently, an attorney-client relationship is not automatically created when
the insurance company hires defense counsel.127 As observed by the court,
[i]t is clear in an insurance situation that a lawyer designated to defend the
insured has a client-lawyer relationship with the insured. The insurer is not,
simply by the fact that it designates the lawyer, a client of the lawyer. Whether
a client-lawyer relationship also exists between the lawyer and the insurer is
determined under § 14 [of the Restatement]. 28
Because there are times when the interests of both parties coincide, the
always present potential conflicts of interest between insurer and insured
do not justify recognition of an absolute prohibition against dual represen-
tation of insurer and insured.1 29 Nevertheless, the court refused to endorse
the view that defense counsel automatically represents both insurer and in-
sured until the conflict actually arises. Sometimes, the potential for conflict
is too great to justify the dual representation. 3 °
The Paradigm court's conclusions regarding whether an attorney-client
relationship exists between an assigned defense counsel and the insurer did
not resolve fully whether the insurer could sue defense counsel for mal-
practice. The court clarified that a lawyer's liability for malpractice does
not depend entirely on the existence of an actual attorney-client relation-
ship. A blanket immunity is avoided by the general rule that recognizes
that in certain circumstances a lawyer owes a duty to a nonclient. T' Rely-
ing on § 5 1(3) of the Restatement'3 2 and the balancing of factors theory,13
the court concluded that the assigned defense counsel owes a duty to the
insurer that arises from the understanding that the lawyer's services are
ordinarily intended to benefit both the insurer and the insured when their
interests coincide. After making these pronouncements, the court declined
to rule on whether Paradigm could sue Langerman for malpractice and
instead remanded the case to the trial court.134
126. Id. at 596.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 596-97 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 134,
cmt. f).
129. Id. at 598.
130. Id. at 599.
131. Id. at 599-600.
132. Id. at 601 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51(3)
cmt. g ("[A] lawyer designated by an insurer to defend an insured owes a duty of care to the
insurer with respect to matters as to which the interests of the insurer and insured are not in
conflict, whether or not the insurer is held to be a co-client of the lawyer.")).
133. Id. at 600.
134. Id. at 601.
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Arizona, like California, recognizes that defense counsel retained to
represent an insured owes a duty to the insurer when the interests of the
parties coincide.' 35 Arizona law, unlike that in California, relies on the Re-
statement for the proposition that defense counsel may under appropriate
circumstances owe a duty to an insurer regardless of whether the insurer is
a client or nonclient. 3 6 Arizona's reliance on traditional negligence princi-
ples as a basis for relief supplants the need for a different standard, namely,
equitable subrogation, to justify liability.
D. Minnesota
In Pine Island Farmers Coop v. Erstad & Riemer, PA.,'37 the Minnesota Su-
preme Court addressed whether (1) defense counsel appointed by an in-
surer to represent an insured had an attorney-client relationship with the
insurer and (2) in the absence of an attorney-client relationship between
defense counsel and the insurer, whether a malpractice action by the in-
surer could be asserted under the doctrine of equitable subrogation.138
Pine Island arose out of a breach of contract and negligence action
brought by Windhorst against Pine Island Farmers Coop resulting from
the coop's sale and installation of a milk metering system on Windhorst's
dairy farn.13 9 Windhorst alleged that as a result of Pine Island's improper
installation of the milk metering system, a number of his cows became con-
taminated with bacteria. 14° Farmland Insurance Co., the insurer, retained
Erstad & Riemer to represent Pine Island in the Windhorst lawsuit.1
4
'
After a substantial jury verdict, Farmland settled with Windhorst while the
case was on appeal. 42
Following the unfavorable outcome, Farmland and Pine Island filed a
malpractice claim against Erstad & Riemer alleging that defendant had an
attorney-client relationship with both in the underlying action. 143 In its an-
swer, Erstad & Riemer denied having an attorney-client relationship with
Farmland.144 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Erstad &
Riemer with respect to all of Farmland's claims on the grounds that Erstad &
Riemer and Farmland did not have an attorney-client relationship. 4
According to the trial court, under Minnesota law, the attorney-client
135. Id. at 602.
136. Id.
137. 649 N.W2d 444 (Minn. 2002).
138. Id. at 448.






145. Id. at 447.
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relationship can be created by contract, either expressed or implied, or
through tort theory.'46 Based on its analysis of the facts, the trial court con-
cluded that Pine Island was Erstad & Riemer's sole client. 141 The trial court
also concluded that despite the absence of an attorney-client relationship
between defense counsel and insurer, the latter could maintain an action
for malpractice against Erstad & Riemer under the doctrine of equitable
subrogation. a14
Farmland and Pine Island appealed the trial court's holding. 49 The Min-
nesota Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's conclusion that defense
counsel and Farmland did not have an attorney-client relationship and re-
versed the trial court on the equitable subrogation issue. 50
The Minnesota Supreme Court began its analysis by recognizing the
long-standing rule that in the insurance context, defense counsel has an
attorney-client relationship with the insured. 5 ' This rule, however, failed
to answer the question whether defense counsel was prohibited from also
forming an attorney-client relationship with the insurer. The court em-
phasized that
[t]he problems caused by conflicts of interest are particularly acute in the in-
surance defense context, where the potential for conflict exists in every case
and actual conflicts are frequent.
The danger is that, if a conflict of interest does arise, the nature of the tri-
partite relationship makes it likely that defense counsel will tend to favor the
interests of the insurer at the expense of those of the insured." 2
Due to the unique characteristics of the tripartite relationship among
insurer, insured, and defense counsel, the court declined Farmland's invita-
tion to apply the general rules for determining the existence of an attor-
ney-client relationship.' Instead, the court thought it more appropriate
to supplement the general rules to allow for dual representation where
(1) there is an absence of a conflict of interest between the insured and the
insurer; (2) defense counsel or another attorney consulted with the insured,
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. The trial court acknowledged that there was no Minnesota law on the issue. How-
ever, it relied exclusively on Atlanta International Insurance Co. v. Bell, 475 N.W2d 294, 298(Mich. 1991), for its holding that the doctrine of equitable subrogation was applicable. Pine
Island Farmers Coop v. Erstad & Riemer, PA., 649 N.W2d 444, 447 (Minn. 2002).
149. Pine Island Farmers Coop, 649 N.W2d at 447.
150. Id. The appellate court held that "the insured is the sole client of the defense attor-
neys hired by the insurer." Id. (quoting Pine Island Farmers Coop v. Erstad & Riemer, P.A.,
636 N.W 2d 604, 609 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001)).
151. Id. at 449.
152. Id. at 450.
153. Id. at 451.
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explaining the implications of dual representation; and (3) the insured gave
expressed consent to the dual representation. 5 4 The requirements of con-
sultation and consent make it impossible for the insurer to become defense
counsel's co-client without the knowledge and permission of the insured."'
In the absence of meeting these requirements, the insured remains defense
counsel's sole client. 5 6 The advantage of this approach is that it permits
dual representation in cases where the interests of the insured are least likely
to be ignored-that is, when there is no conflict of interest between the in-
sured and insurer and, after being informed of the risks and advantages of dual
representation, the insured makes an informed decision that dual representa-
tion is appropriate.157
Based on the facts of the case, this standard precluded Farmland from pur-
suing a malpractice action on its own behalf against defense counsel.'58
Turning to the issue of whether Farmland was entitled to assert Pine
Island's rights against Erstad & Riemer by maintaining an attorney mal-
practice action pursuant to the doctrine of equitable subrogation, the court
noted that the facts that supported application of the doctrine in Bell were
absent in the instant case. In Bell, the insured did not bring an action for
malpractice against defense counsel. 5 9 This fact significantly influenced the
Michigan Supreme Court to seek recourse to avoid granting blanket im-
munity from malpractice liability to defense counscl. 160 As explained by the
court in Bell, "defense counsel's immunity from suit by the insurer would
place the loss for the attorney's misconduct on the insurer. The only win-
ner produced by an analysis precluding liability would be the malpracticing
attorney. Equity cries out for application under such circumstances." 161
Because Pine Island, the insured, also sued defense counsel for malprac-




157. Id. at 452. The dual representation doctrine directly benefits an insurance company
in that it transforms the company into a co-client of the attorney for purposes of a malprac-
tice claim. It is not clear, however, what if any benefits the doctrine bestows on the insured/
client.
158. Because the record contained no evidence that legal counsel consulted with Pine
Island regarding the possibility of dual representation or that, after being informed of the
risks and advantages of dual representation, Pine Island consented to dual representation,
the court concluded that an attorney-client relationship did not exist between the insurer and
defense counsel. Id. Since the court answered the question of whether the dual representa-
tion doctrine was applicable under the facts of the case in the negative, it was unnecessary to
determine whether (1) an attorney-client relationship existed under general rules of law or
(2) there was a conflict of interest between insured and insurer. Id. n.6.
159. Id. at 452.
160. Id.
161. Id. (citing Atlanta Int'l Ins. Co. v. Bell, 475 N.W2d 294, 298 (Mich. 1991)).
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gation in Bell were not present. Furthermore, equitable subrogation allows
the insurer to step into the shoes of the insured; because Pine Island was
asserting its own claim for malpractice against defense counsel, there were
no empty shoes for Farmland to step into.
Minnesota, like California, recognizes that defense counsel can repre-
sent both the insured and the insurer in the absence of a conflict of interest.
Minnesota law, however, goes a step further and requires that the client/
insured be informed by legal counsel of the advantages and disadvantages
of dual representation and consents to the arrangement. If these require-
ments are not satisfied, defense counsel's sole client is the insured. It is
unclear in Minnesota whether the insurance company can rely on the doc-
trine of equitable subrogation to hold retained defense counsel liable for
malpractice in representing an insured. The court in Pine Island neither
adopted nor rejected the doctrine. It merely declared that the equitable
subrogation was not appropriate in light of the facts of the case.
E. Ohio
In 2005, Ohio became the fifth jurisdiction to report a decision on the issue
of whether a liability insurer possessed standing to assert a malpractice
action against defense counsel assigned to represent an insured. In Swiss
Reinsurance America Corp. v. Roetzel & Andress,162 Frontier Insurance Co.
retained Tom Treadon to defend its insured, Dr. Thomas Robinson, in a
medical malpractice action. 163 Early in the case, Treadon informed Frontier
that the case was defensible but that settlement in the range of $500,000
to $1 million should be considered.164 Treadon repeatedly advised Frontier
that the case should be settled and that Robinson had a greater liability
exposure due to the quality of plaintiff's new expert witnesses.16 In a let-
ter dated April 8, 1997, Robinson also demanded that the case be settled
within the policy limits. 166 The letter also threatened a bad faith suit if the
matter was not successfully resolved. 167
Despite Treadon's advice and Robinson's request, Frontier demanded
that the matter proceed to trial. 6 Frontier replaced Treadon as lead coun-
sel shortly before the trial. 169 Replacement counsel, Gary Goldwasser, also
recommended to Frontier that the case be settled for up to $2 million
162. 837 N.E.2d 1215 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
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before trial. 7 ° Like his predecessor, he also felt that he could put forth a
quality defense if necessary, and the case went to trial pursuant to Frontier's
instructions.'71 After two days, Frontier agreed to settle the matter for $2.2
million.'
After the settlement, Frontier sought recovery from Swiss Reinsurance
Inc. in the amount of $1 million.'73 Swiss Reinsurance contended that
Frontier had a duty to mitigate the damages by suing Treadon for malprac-
tice. 7 4 Swiss Reinsurance refused to contribute to the settlement unless
Frontier filed a malpractice action against Treadon.'75 Frontier filed the
suit and was paid by Swiss Reinsurance.'76
The trial judge granted summary judgment for Treadon because Frontier
lacked standing to pursue a malpractice claim against defense counsel.177
Frontier appealed, asserting that it had standing to sue Treadon because it
was Treadon's client in the underlying medical malpractice case.178 On ap-
peal, Frontier requested that the court determine whether it was Treadon's
client by applying the general rules regarding the creation of an attorney-
client relationship. 7 9 Pursuant to this analysis, Frontier urged that its con-
tract with Treadon as well as his provision of legal advice were sufficient to
create such a relationship. 80
According to the court, application of the general rules for determining
the existence of an attorney-client relationship in the insurance defense
context was not appropriate. 8' Relying on the rationale of the Minnesota
Supreme Court in Pine Island, the court explained:
[d]espite the unique characteristics of the tripartite relationship between de-
fense counsel, insurers, and insureds, Farmland and Pine Island argue that
we should simply apply the general rules regarding the creation of attorney-
client relationships to the facts of this case to determine whether Erstad &
Riemer represented Farmland. Although we agree that an insurer seeking to
establish the existence of an attorney-client relationship with defense counsel
can do so using contract or tort theory, merely applying the general rules
would not adequately address our concerns regarding dual representation in






175. Id. at 1218-19.
176. Id. at 1219.
177. Id.
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of the claims, exchanges of information between defense counsel and the in-
surer-including exchanges in which the insurer seeks, receives, and relies on
legal advice from defense counsel-are bound to occur. Thus, a holding that
these exchanges, standing alone, are sufficient to create an attorney-client
relationship between defense counsel and insurer would result in a rule that
defense counsel represents the insurer in virtually every insurance defense
case. Furthermore, such a holding would allow defense counsel to represent
the insurer without the insured's consent or knowledge of the significant risks
posed by dual representation. I"2
The inherent danger in finding an attorney-client relationship between
insurer and defense counsel is that defense counsel, where there is a con-
flict of interest between insurer and insured, "'may be tempted to help the
client [the insurer] who pays the bills, who will send further business, and
with whom long-standing personal relationships have developed."" 83 Due
to the overwhelming evidence of conflict of interest between the insured
and insurer, the court concluded that Frontier was not Treadon's client. 18 4
Frontier also argued that it possessed standing to sue Treadon through
privity of contract with the client/insured, Robinson. 5 Ohio case law rec-
ognizes that a nonclient has standing to assert a malpractice claim if in
privity with the client for whom the legal services were performed. 8 6 Con-
tractual privity with the client is not, however, the equivalent of privity in
the malpractice context.' Contractual privity with the client is concerned
with whether the parties' interests are the same in the sense that represent-
ing the client is equivalent to representing the party alleging privity with
the client.'88 The primary consideration in determining whether there is
privity between a client and a nonclient is whether the client and third
person share a mutual or successive right of property or other interest. 8 9
Due to the conflict of interest between Robinson as the client/insured
and Frontier, the court concluded that the privity with the client rule was
inapplicable. 19 0
Frontier's final assertion that, even in the absence of an attorney-client
relationship, the doctrine of equitable subrogation entitled it to file a mal-
182. Id. at 1221 (quoting Pine Island Farmers Coop v. Erstad & Riemer, PA., 649 N.W2d
444, 451 (Minn. 2002)).
183. Id. (citing RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, 4 LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 29.16,
at 325 (5th ed. 2000)).
184. Id. at 1222-23.
185. Id. at 1223.
186. Id. at 1220 (citing Simon v. Zipperstein, 512 N.E.2d 636, 638 (Ohio 1987)).
187. Id. at 1223.
188. Id.
189. Id. (citing Sayyah v. Cutrell, 757 N.E.2d 779, 786 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001)).
190. Id.
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practice claim against Treadon, was met with similar resolution.'91 Accord-
ing to the court, the doctrine is not applicable where there is a conflict of
interest between the insured and insurer and the attorney complied with
the insured's interests.192 To permit subrogation under such circumstances
"'would drive a wedge between counsel and the insured to the inexorable
detriment of the attorney-client relationship.' Indeed, the attorney would
be placed in an even more precarious position than is inherent in a tripar-
tite relationship." 193 As noted by the court, "Ohio's zealous guarding of the
attorney-client relationship compels a holding that equitable subrogation
is not available to appellants.11 4
Ohio case law recognizes that an insurer and an insured are the common
client of defense counsel in the absence of a conflict of interest.'9 Thus,
like California and Minnesota, Ohio recognizes the dual representation
doctrine. It also follows California and Arizona in their rejection of eq-
uitable subrogation as a means for expanding defense counsel liability to
include insurers.
F. Equitable Subrogation
In the context of malpractice liability, equitable subrogation is not a basis
for recognizing the existence of an attorney-client relationship."96 Rather,
the doctrine is merely another limited exception to the privity of contract
requirement. The doctrine has received mixed reviews from the courts that
have addressed the issue of whether to adopt or apply it in the context of
insurance defense counsel malpractice. The majority of jurisdictions that
have addressed this issue prohibit the equitable subrogation of an attorney
malpractice action. 19 Courts that have rejected the doctrine rely on the
191. Id. at 1224.
192. Id.
193. Id. (quoting Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Pullman, Comley, Bradley, & Reeves, 929 E2d 103,
107 (2d Cir. 1991)).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1221.
196. For a detailed discussion of the equitable subrogation doctrine, seeJohnny C. Parker,
The Made Whole Doctrine: Unraveling the Enigma Wrapped in the Mystery of Insurance Subroga-
tion, 70 Mo. L. Rav. 723 (2005).
197. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp. v. Roetzel & Andress, 837 N.E.2d 1215, 1224 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2005); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Weiss, 194 P.3d 1063, 1069 (Colo. Ct. App.
2008); Capital Indem. Corp. v. Fleming, 58 P.3d 965, 969 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002); Great Am.
Ins. Co. v. Dover, Dixon Homer P.L.L.C., 456 E3d 909, 912 (8th Cir. 2006) (applying Ar-
kansas law); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. McDonald, Hecht & Solbert, 30 Cal. App. 4th 1373
(1994); Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Pullman, Comley, Bradley & Reeves, 929 F.3d 103, 106 (2d Cir.
1991) (applying Connecticut law); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Salter, 717 So. 2d 141, 142
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Querrey & Harrow, Ltd. v. Transcon. Ins. Co., 861 N.E.2d 719,
723-24 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); Bank IV Wichita v. Am, Mullins, Unruh, Kuhn & Wilson, 827
P.2d 758, 756-66 (Kan. 1992); Am. Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Weber & Rose, P.S.C., 997 S.W2d 12,
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same policy basis that supports the prohibition against the assignment of
an attorney malpractice claim. 198
Although subrogation is technically different from assignment, both
doctrines result in the transference of a cause of action to a third party.
Consequently, both doctrines potentially "undermine the vital relationship
between an attorney and client, unduly burden the justice system, and re-
strict the availability of competent legal services." 9 9 Courts that reject the
doctrine of equitable subrogation place greater emphasis on preservation
of the attorney-client relationship.200 Courts that allow the doctrine tend
to value the shifting of the economic burden to the responsible party over
the protection of the attorney-client relationship. 10'
Because equitable subrogation is a legal fiction, its application is re-
stricted to circumstances where justice demands.2 2 Consequently, courts
that have endorsed the doctrine refuse to apply it when an actual or ap-
parent conflict of interest exists between insured and insurer or where the
insured has asserted a malpractice claim against defense counsel.2 3 The
doctrine is also inapplicable where the insured/client has standing but no
right to sue defense counsel.2°4
III. CONCLUSION
Two forces have reshaped the common law landscape of attorney malprac-
tice law in the context of insurance defense practice-preserving the sanc-
13 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998); St. Paul Ins. Co. v. AFIA Worldwide Ins. Co., 937 F2d 274, 279 (5th
Cir. 1991) (applying Louisiana law); St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Remley, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 59434, at *14 (E.D. Mo. July 13, 2009) (predicting Missouri law).
198. The policy bases underlying the prohibition against assignment of an attorney mal-
practice claim are "(1) protection of the attorney's duties of loyalty and effective advocacy
to the client; (2) the potential of conflict of interest with a third-party plaintiff; and (3) the
potential for an attorney's unlimited liability to unknown third parties." Glover v. Southard,
894 P.2d 21, 26 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994). See also cases cited supra note 197.
199. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 194 P.3d at 1066.
200. Id.
201. See Nat'l Union Ins. Co. v. Dowd & Dowd, P.C., 2 E Supp. 2d 1013, 1022-23 (N.D.
11. 1998); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Birch, Stewart, Kolasch & Birch, LLP, 379 R
Supp. 2d 183, 193 (D. Mass. 2005); Allianz Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 787
N.Y.S.2d 15 18 (App. Div. 2004); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Southland Corp., 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5564, at *9-10 (E.D. Pa., Apr. 21, 1999) (predicting Pennsylvania law); Atlanta Int'l
Ins. Co. v. Bell, 475 N.W.2d 294, 297, 299 (Mich. 1991); Am. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Canal
Ins. Co., 843 S.W2d 480, 484-85 (Tex. 1992).
202. Atlanta Int'l, 475 N.W2d at 299 n.17 ("No fiction shall extend to work an injury; its
proper operation being to prevent mischief, or remedy an inconvenience, that might result
from the general rule of law.").
203. See id. at 299; Pine Island Farmers Coop v. Erstad & Riemer, PA., 649 N.W2d 444,
452 (Minn. 2002).
204. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hoiby & Kanter, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12057, at *8
(E.D. Mich. July 11, 1994).
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tity of the attorney-client relationship and shifting the economic burden
of loss to the responsible party. The first force has led to the universally
recognized rule that, whenever there is a conflict of interest between the
insured and the insurer, an attorney-client relationship exists solely be-
tween the attorney and client. The rule is designed to ensure that the attor-
ney's primary loyalty is to the insured she was retained to defend. The rule
achieves that goal by adopting one of the following views: (1) the attorney-
client relationship exists solely between the insured and defense counsel;"'
(2) where an actual or apparent conflict of interest exists between the in-
sured and the insurer, an attorney-client relationship exists only between
defense counsel and the insured;20 6 (3) generally recognized traditional ex-
ceptions to the privity of contract doctrine sufficiently protect the integrity
of the duty of loyalty;207 or (4) the general rules for determining the exis-
tence of an attorney-client relationship should be supplemented to include
consultation with and consent of the insured.20 8
The second force, which is designed to impose liability where it right-
fully belongs-on the negligent defense counsel-achieves its aim by either
(1) utilizing the doctrine of equitable subrogation2 9 or (2) recognizing, in
the absence of a conflict of interest, that defense counsel owes an indepen-
dent duty to the insurer.210
These two forces are primarily responsible for the uneven and inconsis-
tent state of the law in this area. Thus, while all the jurisdictions that have
addressed the issue agree that compelling and persuasive policy reasons
exist to impose liability, each has developed its own unique solution to the
problem.
205. See Atlanta Int'l, 475 N.W.2d at 297.
206. See Unigard Ins. Group v. O'Flaherty & Belgum, 38 Cal. App. 4th 1229, 1236-37
(1995); Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp. v. Roetzel & Andress, 837 N.E.2d 1215,1222 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2005); Gulf Ins. Co. v. Berger, Kahn, Moss, Figler, Simon & Gladstone, 79 Cal. App. 4th
114, 131 (2000); Paradigm Ins. Co. v. Langerman Law Offices, P.A., 24 P.3d 593, 596 (Ariz.
2001); Pine Island, 649 N.W2d at 451.
207. See Swiss Reinsurance, 837 N.E.2d at 1223; Paradigm, 24 P.3d at 599.
208. See Pine Island, 649 N.W2d at 451.
209. See Atlanta Int'l Ins. Co. v. Bell, 475 N.W2d 294, 297 (Mich. 1991).
210. See Unigard, 38 Cal. App. 4th at 1236-37.
